Here is what I found on top of a document:
It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle's response (to be pedantic-the universe's response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe.
- Why would a particle be "determined by the entire previous history of the universe" anyway?
- What does that mean, even in determinism, as opposed to being determined by a strand of causation reaching back to the beginning of the universe?
- Why would a particle determined by free-will as opposed to being determined by the entire previous history of the universe be in itself free-willed? I smell a terminological error:
- a) this supposes any behaviour of anything or any event is either determined by the entire previous history of the universe or free-willed.
- b) what if beside the two there were behaviours and events determined by free-will?
- c) what if there are not even any events determined by the entire previous history of the universe but only those that constitute acts of free-will and those that are determined by acts of free-will?
- a) this supposes any behaviour of anything or any event is either determined by the entire previous history of the universe or free-willed.
So far my challenge. To JR, known also from two debates on geocentrism (my stance) and heliocentrism (his).
1) scripsi: Why would a particle be "determined by the entire previous history of the universe" anyway?
respondisti: "Cause and effect. In essence Conway and Kochen are pointing out that we couldn't have free will in a clockwork universe. If it's all dictated by Newton's laws of motion and so forth then everything proceeds along like billiard balls with no free will to do otherwise."
a) cause and effect implies that every physical cause has its effect unless hindered: it does not imply that every physical effect has only physical causes.
resp: No, but whether physical or unphysical it would still be "a clockwork universe" if there was no true indeterminacy in either physical or unphysical form.
b) (see 2) a clockwork is interconnected, but even on an atheist view we would not have one clockwork universe, but a clockworks universe: even with an original clockwork at big bang, we would have a branching out into different independent clockworks, like the galaxies, like the solar systems, like each planet, like different places on earth:
[resp: Well yes, but ultimately all of these clockworks in the big bang would originate at a first cause back at the singularity.]
a man cannot be seen to be affected by storms on Venus or CO2 freezing on Mars, nor can a man in France be seen to be affected by everything that goes on around the Gulf of Mexico, though he is affected by weather, which is affected by Gulf Stream. But the Gulf Stream originating is only one thing of the things that go on in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Gulf Stream is only one thing which affects the weather in France, and the weather is only one thing that affects a man i France.
resp:No but theoretically in a clockwork universe if we go back far enough all of these things would be caused by the same thing.
c) NOTHING is dictated BY Newton's laws. The question is if all is dictated ACCORDING TO Newton's laws by previous only physical causes. That does not only contradict a speculation about free will, it contradicts the most elementary piece of introspection even or especially if it is just glancing introspection in an extrovert person doing an extrovert thing.
resp:Yes, exactly, IF everything is dictated by Newton's laws then free will is impossible. That was the essence of Conway and Kochen's theorem. Basically if there is free will we must conclude that there is more than just Newton's laws.
2) scripsi: What does that mean, even in determinism, as opposed to being determined by a strand of causation reaching back to the beginning of the universe?
"It's the same thing really."
Not so. Under 1 b I stated the difference. Shall I take the response as meaning you do not consider the naturalistic view a clockwork universe but a clockworks universe, and "determined by all the previous history of the ENTIRE universe" a piece of loose terminology?
Ok yes, see I would think that everything would have a singular starting point. But yes that may also be valid -clockwork(s). So even if all of the casual chains are unlinked in a Newtonian world we could figure out the position and velocity of every particle at any point in time and then compute out how everything will behave for all points in time going out to eternity. And hence since everything would be predetermined there would be no room for free will.
3 general, scripsi: Why would a particle determined by free-will as opposed to being determined by the entire previous history of the universe be in itself free-willed? I smell a terminological error:
respondisti: "In itself it's not, but the idea is that if we have indeterminism in particles we might be able as minds to exploit this indeterminism in a special way so as to tap into it and give us "willed indeterminism" (ie. we will something which can not be predetermined by someone else)"
In that case it would be determined by indeterminacy of particles. Or?
In a sense yes, though the trick is that the indeterminacy would have to be exploited in such a way that it could be exploited by the mind.
A good thing to remember here is that at the quantum level you are not dealing with "particles" so much as you are wave-functions or "wavicles." It's not like a particle gets "a mind of its own" and randomly bumps into a mind causing it to do something that it wouldn't ordinarily do.
In particular in Penrose's model the mind is a special kind of wave-function that behaves in a certain way unlike any other kinds of wave-functions. In this case it's the same indeterminacy that you would get in any other quantum system, but you can exploit it because it's internal to you -the self-collapsing wave-function that is identical with your mind.
I have the feeling from your response, a will in your philosophy is not a prime reality in and of itself, but a human will is a product of particles in the brain.
[resp:It's not particles remember. That's the catch. Everything at the bottom is indeterministic in nature and precise location in time and space also break down. Particles exist in precise places in space and time, and so it's a misconception to think that these are particles in the proper sense of the word.
In a way everything seems to behave "mentally" far enough down -I'm presuming the patterns in the wave-function are ultimately the thoughts in God's mind.(because of Universal Orch-OR -like in my video) And then our minds are subsets within that. Now granted I'm a neutral monist and I think it's all information at the bottom -and minds are just special kinds of information, but there is a distinctly "mental" component to the world when you dig far enough down into it.]
Behind this I do smell a dichotomy that is stated as the terminology I attribute you under 3 a: this supposes any behaviour of anything or any event is either determined by the entire previous history of the universe or free-willed.
Well not free-willed per se. Obviously you can have subatomic particles behave in indeterministic fashions which are not willed. But the point is that things are either deterministic of indeterministic, and that if we have free will it would be because we've found a way to tap into the indeterministic part of it and use it somehow.
3 b) scripsi: what if beside the two there were behaviours and events determined by free-will?
respondisti: "It's not "free-will" as such as the particles aren't minds in and of themselves, but they do display indeterminacy in the quantum regime."
Thank you for saying the particles are not minds in and of themselves. But leaving particles aside: can there in your general view of philosophy be something neither indetermined as in free-willed nor determined as in physically caused by physical causes only but determined by free-will?
Well the definition of free will is that it is both determined by free-will yet "indetermined" as observed from the outside. Meaning you can determine exactly what you will do but I can not predict what you will do -even in theory- from the outside. Only you know.
scripsi 3 c) what if there are not even any events determined by the entire previous history of the universe but only those that constitute acts of free-will and those that are determined by acts of free-will?
"That would be interesting, and in fact if my Universal Orch-OR theory about God is right then it would follow that EVERYTHING at some level or another would be freely chosen into existence by God, which would mean not predetermined by mechanical causation. Though it appears that God freely chose to collapse a series of quantum states which gives us a decent approximation of deterministic laws at most levels."
My point can be made further precise by the questions:
d) could there be a God that is free-willed and NOT a wave function of the Universe? If not, why not?
Yes and no lol. I'm sure there might be some who subscribe to my Universal Orch-OR model that say it couldn't be any other way, but as for what I believe personally let me try to see if I can break this down. It might be a bit tricky.
Basically the totality of existence -including stuff outside the universe is ultimately Platonic in nature -rather than material -I know it's surreal but just follow. And the largest Platonic form which encompasses all others is ultimately God's Mind. Within that we have different modal realities:
Wiki: Modal Realism
and one of these modal realities happens to be our own which is defined by the Schrodinger equation. Now a mind in my philosophy is an "isomorphic information pattern." And you can have nesting isomorphisms all the way up and all the way down. The isomorphic structure we are in is defined by the Schrodinger equation, and hence any isomorphic information patterns we see will automatically have to be wave-functions collapsing by Orch-OR.
So in a sense yes God's mind (as viewed from our end) has to be a Universal Orch-OR, but that's because of how our universe is defined. However God's mind might appear differently to universe's defined by different sets of mathematics than ours.
In a sense I may have mislead a little bit by directly equating the Wave-function of the Universe with God's mind (but that is because the atheists will only accept what is immediate to them). Now to be sure it is God's mind, but it is the "lower bound" of God's mind -only the part we can observe from this end.
e) could in the universe there be other free wills than God's?
Also yes and no lol! They would exist but in a sense would be part of God's will as well. This seems like it might contradict a first, but it has to do with my "nesting isomorphisms" thing. Basically our minds are contained in God's mind the same way that nesting Russian dolls contain others. And so God's free will would ultimately be the only free will, but in a sense we would share it as God's free will would overlap or perhaps "superpose" our own.
4 ) I think I will cut the strands here and give a general short answer. Leading up, if you like to new strands:
a) A "non-physical" cause would still be a cause. But it may well be a free-willed cause.
Well let's suppose you have that. So you have material causes as well as supernatural causes -and both with their rules. From those rules we can pre...dict what would happen -it doesn't matter if the causes are physical or not. If that is the case then we can not have free-will, because the whole idea is that you can't predict what someone will do with free-will.
The free wills need not follow deterministic rules.
The results from spiritual causes, including free-willed ones would, which would make the results predictable for anyone having beforehand access to the free decisions, i e to God omniscient.
To us the results would not be globally predictable.
You may predict what result a certain squeeze of thumb and index and a certain turn will do to the writing, but that does not mean you can predict what someone else will write.
Even a clockworks universe or a clockwork universe will be unpredictable since you simply do not have access to all interlocking strands of physical unfree causation.
b) Free will implies indeterminacy as to something. Not indeterminacy as to everything. A man deciding whether to look or not look at a woman is not deciding whether he is virile and what effects that look might have on him.
But the point that Kochen and Conway are getting at is that if we have free-will that can not be predicted, then we have to get that unpredictable element from somewhere. A clockwork universe does not give us an unpredictable element. A universe in which we have free will thus therefore have an unpredictable element somewhere buried in it.
The classical Christian answer is that the universe contains unpredictable elements, where God, angels, and human minds figure. Unpredictable not as in totally haphazard like exact chaos pattern of falling paint drops, but unpredictable as in indetermined. We experience that ourselves.
Why should the source of free wills be other than a free will?
c) A particle determined by free will is determined. Not by the "entire history of the universe" nor by a partial clockwork leading back to one original cause, but by a decision taking place within the history. Still counts as determined. The decision itself being indetermined.
Ok, scrap "determined." Replace it with predictable. Free-will would then be something which is not predictable yet determined.
Determined and predictable are not interchangeable.
A dancer is not determined by any clockworks to take p...art in the dance, he is thus indetermined, yet, if skillful, predictable. Which is my geocentric take on why stars and planets even if guided by angels follow predictable patterns of movement.
His feet are determined by his will. Not by an outside cause making the will obsolete. They are predictable insofar as the dance is.
The feet of a man walking are also determined and also by a free will, but very much less predictable.
And where each drop will fall if you drop a bucket of paint is entirely due to physical causes, or so it seems, but still unpredictable.
Free-will is an unpredictable thing, indetermined by outer causes except those that define the choice. Its results - moving hands - moving instruments - moving objects are determined by it. And sometimes calculable, sometimes not.
d) God is not determined by his creatures except insofar as he choses to be: and we are not free against God except insofar as he lets us. Still we have true own minds, true free wills.
Yes, like I said our free-will is overlapped or "superposed" by God's.
Neither overlapped nor superposed. Defined insofar as our creator defines what kind of free will we have and what kind of choices we have.
e) God has created only one world, though he could have created possible other worlds. (as against Giordano Bruno)
Hmm, No. As for this universe who knows, however there are definitely parallel worlds with versions of us playing out different histories in those universes. Quantum mechanics tells us this and the existence of parallel universes has even been exploited to produce quantum computers.
If you want further proof I have something to show you if you'd like in private. Though I would prefer if you not show anyone else.
I saw that proof, they are not really proof of parallel universes.
I do not know what a quantum computer is, but if you attribute its observed behaviour to "parallel universes" I think you are as far off the mark as an ordinary computer being looked at as "good at mathematics" or a translating programme being looked at as linguistically competent. I Smell a terminological or logical very red herring here.
on to second part of debate ...